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SO: This is Sue Onslow talking, again, to Mr Carl Wright at the 
Commonwealth Local Government Forum on Northumberland Avenue 
on Tuesday, 12 March, 2013. Carl, thank you very much indeed for 
agreeing to talk to me again. I wonder if you could begin by saying, 
please, how did you come to be involved in things Commonwealth in 
the first place? 
 
CW: Well it goes back a long time. I think my very first Commonwealth 
engagement, if I remember correctly, was about April 1980 when I attended 
the Zimbabwe independence celebrations on the splendid occasion with Bob 
Marley. But how did I get engaged? Well, at that time I was just taking up my 
new post of a brand new Commonwealth body called the Commonwealth 
Trade Union Council, which had just been newly set up and I was the 
founding Director of that organisation back in 1980. How I got involved with 
that was I was previously working at World Trade Union Organisation based 
in Brussels called the ICFTU, the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions, which was the main western world body on trade unions. This 
obviously got me involved in quite a few Commonwealth countries like Sri 
Lanka and others at the time and that organisation, where I was the 
Economic Secretary, had a lot to do with the International Labour 
Organisation, ILO, in Geneva and ran conferences. For some years I was the 
Secretary of that annual conference at the ILO. During that ILO conference 
the British TUC used to organise a meeting and a dinner for Commonwealth 
delegates, which I got increasingly drawn into. I guess that was through my 
first formal contact. You’re talking about informal Commonwealth trade union 
meetings [unclear 01.43], the mid to late ‘70s. 
 
SO: Yes, so had you been involved at a much more grass roots level in 
organising protection for workers’ rights, etc? 
 
CW: In so far as I was quite engaged at the international level, but it involved 
myself in doing things like running around tea estates in Sri Lanka and other 
places in the world, trying to help with labour rights and grass root issues; but 
it was always from the international angle, as it were. 
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SO: You said that the British Trade Union Council was particularly influential 
in helping to set up the CTUC. 
 
CW: CTUC, yes. In fact we were based at Congress House headquarters in the 
UK, but others were influential as well. I think the other organisation which 
was very instrumental was the Canadian Labour Congress, which was the 
equivalent body in Canada and CTUC was a Commonwealth body. The other 
trade union organisations from Africa and Asia all took part in it and Australia 
and places like that. 
 
SO: Did you have any ‘below-the-radar contacts’ with South African trade 
union organisations at this particular point? 
 
CW: We did at the ICFTU in Brussels. There was already a committee in the mid-
‘70s which was already doing some early stuff on sanctions and at that time I 
was very actively involved in the whole sanction’s campaign; and that then 
naturally lead us to continue that engagement when we established a 
Commonwealth Trade Union Council. 
 
SO: So how was this funded? Was this funded by dues from national trade 
union councils? 
 
CW: Yes, primarily and we did get a little bit of programme money from the old 
ODA, which was of course the old UK development ministry [unclear 03.23] 
for actual training work and activities of that nature. 
 
SO: What are your principal responsibilities for organising international, or 
rather transnational, collaboration to ensure that there was a degree of 
standardisation of protection of workers’ rights, trade bargaining 
mechanisms? 
 
CW: Yes, it was linking in. I mean, as I say, the world body I was working with 
previously was heavily involved in ILO labour standards which are formal 
conventions on child labour and that kind of thing, and trying to enforce those 
and make sure that those were duly respected. But being a Commonwealth 
body our focus was really establishing links with the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, getting advocacy under way, making sure that trade union 
policies and inputs were taken into account by the Secretariat and we were 
very successful in that. I give two examples. I served on two quite important 
expert groups that the Secretariat set up in the ‘80s: one was on youth 
employment issues globally which reported to CHOGM, and then the other 
one, if I remember correctly, was at the time quite a revolutionary group. It 
was on new technologies and you’re talking now about the mid-‘80s when 
that was still a very pre-internet age. It was quite an inventive working group 
and I put the trade union views on both those groups which were official 
expert groups set up by, I think, the Economic Affairs Division. Then what we 
were able to instigate as a result of that advocacy, I think we set it up within a 
few years, was a formal meeting of Commonwealth Ministers of Labour which 
took place, again, during the ILO conference in Geneva. That was obviously 
the time when all these ministers were together and we were able to up the 
ante from what was purely a trade union meeting to a formal meeting of 




SO: This must’ve been a challenging time in political terms for you, because 
this is the 1980s: the hey-day of the Thatcher/Reagan “revolution”. 
 
CW: Indeed, it didn’t help matters, but of course Britain was only one of many 
countries in the Commonwealth and, of course, as we found out fairly 
imminently on the whole South Africa business, it was very much isolated in 
the Commonwealth. We had some strong allies like Bob Hawke of Australia 
who at one stage, when he had been a trade union leader, before he became 
Prime Minister, had served on my board. 
 
SO: So you had particularly good links with a key political persona? 
 
CW: Exactly and other Labour leaders from other countries who went in to 
Parliament or became ministers.… Another example of somebody quite 
prominent who served on my CTUC board was Joseph Rwegasira who, after 
being Trade Union Leader in Tanzania, went on to become, the Foreign 
Minister of Tanzania. 
 
SO: At this particular time then did you also try to foster good links with the 
Trade Union movement here in this country? Because in the mid-1980s 
is the time of the miners’ strike. It was very much the agenda of the 
Thatcher government to “roll back” the position of the unions. 
 
CW: Yes. We didn’t, I guess, get too involved in what was obviously a very 
domestic issue in the UK. It did have ramifications, of course, for the wider 
engagement, but there was always a very strong commitment, even at that 
difficult time, for the British Labour movement to international work, whether it 
was in South Africa, whether it was all the Labour rights. A lot of the top 
Labour leaders, at the time, from individual unions, apart from the TUC itself, 
were very engaged internationally. There was a TUC International Committee 
which I sat on and which I reported to; and so although all this business was 
going on domestically with the miners and the anti-trade union legislation, our 
focus all the time really was on the international side. And I must say, to the 
credit of British trade unions, they were heavily supportive on the international 
work throughout. 
 
SO: Dennis MacShane has commented that the South African Labour 
movement looked, particularly in this time, to the model of Polish 
Solidarity as a particular form of non-state Labour organisation. Is that 
your recollection as well? 
 
CW: Solidarity, of course, was very much in the news. I’m not sure how far the 
South African trade unions were necessarily copying that. I mean, there were 
two major strands, as I’m sure you know. One was the UDM internal 
structures which, I think, had some elements perhaps similar to Solidarity 
movement. But, of course, they were also very closely linked to the exiled 
ANC more Moscow orientated trade unions and that was a problem at that 
time. This was still the days of the old Cold War and there was a division in 
the International Trade Union Movement between the West and the Eastern 
blocs. Being very frank, one of my problems as a Commonwealth body was 
we didn’t discriminate between any kind of ideological groupings. So we had, 
for example, some Communist unions from India who were members, 
although the majority were western, what we would class as perhaps more 
normal trade unions. But ultimately, as a Commonwealth body, we didn’t 
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differentiate between ideological blocks and that occasionally ran into some 
difficulties, not least when, certainly in Britain, there was still quite a strong 
western orientation and nervousness about Communist links and the East. 
 
SO: In what ways were these tensions manifested? 
 
CW: Let me give you an example. One thing, I guess, I can claim personal credit 
for … well with help from some other friends … was that I was able to 
engineer what was the first official meeting between Oliver Tambo, who was 
then of course Head of the ANC, and the British trade unions. I think it 
would’ve been about 1985 and things were really hotting up in South Africa 
and the reason there had never been any links between Oliver Tambo and 
the ANC and the trade union wing of the ANC, called SACTU, was because 
the British TUC regarded them as being too close to Moscow. 
 
SO: Because of the South African Communist Party’s close cooperation with 
the ANC? 
 
CW: Yes, exactly and so what we were able to do is to overcome some of those 
fears and say: “Look, what we’re concerned about is the apartheid problem. 
We’re not playing international politics in terms of East and West”. I think we 
were able to have an opportunity of overcoming that a bit. 
 
SO: You then acted as a facilitator or as a bridge? 
 
CW: Yes. And it gives me chance to give you the famous quote which I got from 
Oliver (Tambo) at the time which was something I remember when he said to 
me -  it was about ’85 in Geneva, ‘Of course, comrade Wright’, as he used the 
‘comrade’ term of course, ‘South Africa is still a member of the 
Commonwealth’, which I was a bit perplexed by. And then he qualified about 
saying, … because I said to him, I thought we’d kicked the bastards out! 
 
SO: In 1961, indeed! 
 
CW: Indeed and then he qualified this saying: “Oh no, that was just the regime. 
The people are still members of the Commonwealth”, which I thought was 
rather nice coming from him and also there was a political message there to 
the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: That was a political message he’d given Sonny Ramphal, as well. 
 
CW: Indeed, he used the same terminology. 
 
SO: Yes and Ramphal was enormously relieved to have that message from 
Tambo. 
 
CW: Yeah, the other little episode, I don’t know if you want to go on to the EPG. 
Well, again without blowing my own trumpet, CTUC trumpet I should say, if 
you read Sonny Ramphal’s memoirs, he’s very, very gracious in attributing 
the original context of the EPG to the Commonwealth Trade Union Council 
because it was something which we had conceptualised as a compromise 
between sanctions and negotiations and linking the two together as an 
alternative to only sanctions or only negotiations which of course the British 
wanted. We came up with the idea just before the CHOGM in the Bahamas 
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in1985. We talked about it with our friends which happened to be Bob Hawke 
who was then Prime Minister and Salim Salim of Tanzania, the Foreign 
Minister, who then talked to Sonny; and then, of course, Sonny picked up the 
ball and ran with it and he deserves full credit for making it happen. But in his 
memoirs, he does actually attribute the idea to us which was rather gracious 
of him. 
 
SO: If I could go back to just where this idea of an EPG came from: was it 
something that you discussed over an informal meeting, that then 
acquired shape and form over these informal and discreet discussions? 
Or was it like Anthony Eden, in his bath, coming up with the idea of 
German rearmament in NATO by expanding the West European Union in 
1954? 
 
CW: Oh no, it was something done in close consultation with our South African 
friends and clearly there were different views there, particularly the ANC and 
SACP who would be much more insistent on sanctions. I think the UDM 
group also were keen on sanctions but saw there was maybe some case for 
having some pressures and negotiations linked to that. What we wanted to do 
was to have a compromise which would allow us to move forward and if the 
EPG failed then sanctions would clamp in, which is exactly what happened of 
course. 
 
SO: You’ve mentioned the ANC: I know this is very much the era when the 
ANC was pushing to be recognised as the sole voice of black South 
Africans. However there were tensions with UDM as you’ve mentioned, 
from its formation in 1984, and also the long standing animosity 
between the PAC and the ANC. How did you deal with all of this? 
 
CW: With great difficulty. But we actually were the only body, certainly trade union 
wise, that managed to bring everybody together. So we were able to bring 
together the ANC trade union wing, of course very closely allied, as I 
mentioned already, at the meeting with Oliver Tambo. We managed to bring 
together the PAC trade union wing and also, obviously, the UDM and 
organise joint meetings where were able to meet and that continued 
subsequently into the late ‘80s when I moved on to the Secretariat, with some 
resources from the Secretariat. So the Commonwealth, whether in the shape 
of the Trade Union Council or the Secretariat, was playing quite a major role 
in bringing together the different factions in South Africa and outside South 
Africa and allowing them to develop joint strategies, which incidentally is the 
same thing we were doing within Namibia as well with SWAPO. 
 




SO: How did you go about this? Did you invite them to meet you in Lusaka? 
Did you invite them to meet you in Gabarone? After all you’d have to get 
the political personalities together. 
 
CW: Well the easiest, of course, was, as I mentioned a minute ago, was Geneva, 
because everybody came to Geneva. The ILO had a standing committee, if I 
remember correctly, which was looking at the whole apartheid thing like all of 
the UN bodies, so they had been inviting and ANC came to Geneva so that 
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was the initial place where we got people together and then from that we had 
meetings elsewhere in London and other places and eventually as we moved 
towards the late ‘80s then we were using a lot of Front Line States. I 
remember we must’ve done at least a dozen trade union workshops in Harare 
where we brought people from Lusaka and from inside South Africa, people 
like Cyril Ramaphosa, Sydney Mufamadi and Jay Naidoo. 
 
SO: Was the British government, in any way, trying to use these 
transnational networks as a way to make discreet contact with the ANC? 
After all, governments talk to governments. I’ve listened to Jonathan 
Powell emphasising this, and I understand that particular approach. 
However, junior officials have responsibility to talk to all sides; so was 
there a degree of exploiting your particular lines of contact? 
 
CW: Not at any political level. If anything, don’t forget, this was the hey-day, as you 
rightly said, of Thatcher and her position was very clear on the ANC being a 
terrorist organisation. I always remember a wonderful little anecdote receiving 
a letter from Number 10 where we’d written on behalf of the CTUC calling for 
sanctions and we’d had the standard Foreign Office reply signed by Thatcher 
back about why they didn’t support sanctions. But there was a nice little 
personal touch because the key sentence was: “… therefore the British 
government does not support sanctions” and the word ‘not’ was underlined 
about three times in red ink. 
 
SO: What about the British Labour Party at this particular time? Up to 1983/4 
of course its leader was Michael Foot and then Neil Kinnock: was 
Kinnock particularly active and politically supportive? 
 
CW: Very much so and, of course, Glenys Kinnock of course also, both very 
involved in the anti-apartheid movement; so there’s that very strong link with 
the anti-apartheid movement. I certainly recall about ‘86/’87 having various 
meetings where he took part in Congress House and there was, from the 
opposition certainly, a lot of support for some of this work. 
 
SO: You mentioned the difficulty of getting the differing elements of the 
PAC, UDM and ANC and the varying trade union organisations wings 
together in the same room. To what extent do you think that that, in 
those early days, helped to establish contact between them, with a view 
to moving to the negotiations post-1990? 
 
CW: I think it was significant. Let me give you examples of what we concretely did 
in the Commonwealth context. When we had CHOGM and certainly by the 
time we had CHOGM in Vancouver in ’89, we had a delegation which was 
composed of the different sort of trade union wings certainly PAC and UDM 
wings. We also had meetings in London, as I said earlier, and I think it did 
bring them together quite a bit and allowed them to develop joint strategies 
and that obviously continued subsequently. Maybe I’m delving too much into 
anecdotes, but my other interesting little story was when we had Jay Naidoo 
who you may know was a senior minister in the Mandela government but at 
that time led the trade unions. When he came to London we put him up in a 
little hotel in Russell Square and the very first evening he was there we went 
out for dinner and came back to find his hotel room totally ransacked in a very 
obvious way. It was clearly the South African security who were telling him, as 
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a message, ‘You’re maybe with your mates but we’re keeping an eye on er 
you.’ So things like that went on even in London. 
 
SO: Carl, when you joined the Secretariat in 1988, did you continue with 
these trade union contacts through the Commonwealth Trade Union 
Council or did that side of your responsibilities lapse? 
 
CW: No, very much so. I did other things as well on Mozambique and other areas 
of work, but no, if anything, it’s continued in quite a substantial way. I think 
between ’88 and maybe ’92, I would say the Secretariat must’ve funded 
anything up to about 20 trade union events in Front Line States which was 
designed exactly to develop those kinds of policies, which I helped to 
coordinate. 
 
SO: The story of South Africa is, of course, much better known and 
researched than the story of Namibia. The December of 1988 agreement 
between South Africa and Cuba stipulated there should be a mutual 
withdrawal from Angola and also the associated parallel negotiations 
for Namibian independence. Were you intimately involved in that side of 
things? 
 
CW: Not directly in the negotiations, but again gently through the trade union 
wings. So again we were bringing together the exiled wing and the internal 
organisers and we were doing the same sort of thing in two ways. we were, 
through the Secretariat, funding scholarships for key people in places like 
Tanzania and other Front Line States, but also we had exactly the same 
strategy on a smaller scale as we subsequently did for South Africa where we 
organised events in places like Harare where we allowed the two to come 
together and basically, although there was a formal agenda of course, it 
allowed them the opportunity to do a lot of their joint strategies and exchange 
views and come closer together. 
 
SO: I do know that between 1991-1994 Moses Anafu, at the Secretariat, was 
intimately involved in trying to contribute to the discussions and 
particularly to persuading Inkhata that it shouldn’t withdraw totally from 
the negotiations. Were you in any way supportive of these efforts and 
did Inkhata have a particular trade union wing or affiliation? 
 
CW: Well, certainly there were meetings I attended in various country houses in 
the UK where Inkhata and others were present; so I was a little bit on the 
periphery of some of these goings on and I was invited to various events. 
 
SO: So are you talking about Mells Park? 
 
CW: No, this is more in Wilton House and places like that or at separate meetings, 
I wasn’t involved in the Mells Park one. So it is a bit on the periphery, I guess, 
but at that time, of course, there was the push from British government to 
support Inkhata as an alternative and they were being promoted. But, again, 
there was an attempt to try and, I guess, bring the different factions together. 
 
SO: So, obviously you paid close attention to the observer group team that 
went down there; Did you provide any briefing paper to support the 
CODESA team or anything like that? I just wondered if in any way that 
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you were aware of the CODESA meetings with Mandela, De Klerk, and 
the contribution of the Secretariat? 
 
CW: Only in very general terms, I can’t say we were involved in the intimacies of it. 
I mean we were more really acting as a facilitator to continue the outside 
pressure as much as anything and continue. I did go to South Africa once or 
twice in that time, both in my CTUC days and subsequently, of course, and 
had links with various people. 
 
SO: What was your particular opinion of Cyril Ramaphosa as, after all, a 
leading trade unionist? 
 
CW: Very high opinion. At the time, he was probably the leading light and, of 
course, subsequently, as you know, as Secretary General of the ANC, did 
most of the negotiations with Rolf Meyer [unclear 22.50] and I think, certainly 
as far as I can see, he really drove that whole exercise in a very big way. So, 
yes I have a very high opinion of Cyril. 
 
SO: Did you, in any way, provide supporting briefing material? Or in these 
negotiations was he able to draw on his own particular negotiating 
skills, his own intellect, his own experience? 
 
CW: No, we didn’t directly. Go back a step a few years earlier, I think I can say I 
organised Cyril’s first overseas trip which was one of our trade union 
meetings in Harare and some of the initial, maybe if you like, background 
which then led on to a bit later to CODESA stuff, was probably where we 
made a contribution. But I wasn’t directly involved in the CODESA things in 
any way. 
 
SO: I was talking to Ambassador Abdul Minty on Friday. His comment was 
that he felt that the Commonwealth played a significant and 
unrecognised role in the transition of South Africa to black majority rule 
and this was not simply in the International Solidarity Movement to try 
to exert pressure on sanctions and also disinvestment, etc. But there 
was a much more positive role between 1990-1994. 
 
CW: In  a sense I have skipped quite an important chapter and again it depends 
how much this was directly used in CODESA, I’m not sure. But I think we 
touched last time already on the Commonwealth report on human resource 
developments for post apartheid which I think gave some useful resource 
material to the negotiators. When it came to issues around black 
empowerment and the public service or even in education and universities, 
the report tried to document as far as we could at the time what were the 
issues, how they could potentially be overcome and we also did actually do 
some number crunching. I don’t know if you had a chance to look at the 
report, but at the time I think it was quite a detailed document which Penguin 
published as a paperback. What it was really meant to do was to set out the 
agenda for the post-apartheid transition. That work, I think, started around 
‘91/’92 and then I was commuting to South Africa very regularly, while the 
CODESA process was going on. As I said I didn’t input into it directly, but I 
think indirectly I’m sure some of the work that came out of the group 
contributed, although it wasn’t really finished until about ’93 or thereabouts; so 
it was really a bit late in the negotiations. But it was meant to provide the 
basis for the post-apartheid transition and I think it was used quite a bit. 
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Indeed the main use of the report, which was done in collaboration with the 
UN, but it was a Commonwealth initiative which I was basically the Secretary 
to was the convening of the post-April ’94 International Donors Conference in 
Cape Town in late 1994 which brought resources from different donors for the 
post-apartheid transition, of course, which was still very important for those 
early years. 
 
SO: Did you have an official view when South Africa changed from its 
socialist agenda immediately post-black majority rule and then went 
much more for an economic liberalisation and market reform strategy? 
 
CW: Well that kind of happened, or should I say, I think it happened over time. I 
think there was quite a strong period in ‘94/’95 when there was quite a lot of 
affirmative action when there was the RDP, Jay Naidoo was responsible for 
as Minister of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, which did 
have quite a strong interventionist element to it and the liberalisation didn’t 
come until a little bit later. There were some elements of it and it was partly to 
reassure the Afrikaaner, of course. But I think the real stronger liberalisation, I 
think maybe came a bit later. 
 
SO: Did the Commonwealth, as far as you were aware, continue to offer 
expert advice or was this now an era of South Africa financial and 
economic sovereignty? 
 
CW: I changed hats, of course, at that time. I finished the Secretariat in ’94 just 
after we’d completed this exercise on post-apartheid and switched over to the 
Local Government Forum. One of the first things we did was to take experts 
to the South Africans to help them with their local government system and the 
local government structures. 
 
SO: Or lack of local government structures? 
 
CW: Well lack of them, still very much apartheid based with a lot of white 
structures and parallel black structures and trying to bring them together and 
to give you one concrete example which actually I’m very pleased it found its 
way in to the new legislation We had a colleague from Australia at the time, a 
local government colleague who was involved and we sent him out. He had 
this, I think, rather nice little concept which he always said there are no such 
things as ‘levels’ of government because levels implies tiers and hierarchy 
and why should local government be at the bottom of the level? You know it 
has its own sphere of responsibility and so we don’t believe in levels; but we 
believe in ‘spheres’ of government where each sphere local, provincial, 
central or federal if you like, has its own area of responsibility. Sure enough 
the concept of spheres of government found its way into the legislation and is 
reflected in the South African constitution. So we did have an input. 
 
SO: But one of the key challenges, it strikes me, with South Africa’s 
transition from apartheid is to address this lack of local government, 




SO: And so if there isn’t a strong state at local or indeed regional level, how 




CW: Exactly. And if you go back to the report of the Commonwealth post-
apartheid, we did have a chapter already in there on local government as well 
as central government and the importance of having that transition from the 
apartheid structures and having more integrated, non-racial local government 
structures and that transition took a long time and you could argue that some 
of it’s still with us. 
 
SO: You’ve mentioned a number of key personalities today - I’m going to 
suggest to you that the Commonwealth is very much a personality and 
network political organisation. 
 
CW: It has its role. 
 
SO: You’ve mentioned Neil Kinnock and Glenys Kinnock; Cyril Ramaphosa, 
… also Bob Hawke, of course. But were there any other particular 
leading lights within the International Trade Union movement that 
contributed to South African transition through the Commonwealth? 
 
CW: Not to forget I mentioned Jay Naidoo. The other key South African 
personality, was Sydney Mufamadi who, of course, became subsequently 
much later the Minister of Local Government. But he was a leading trade 
unionist as well; I think he was on the CTUC delegation, we had in Vancouver 
at the CHOGM back in ’87 together with Jay Naidoo, but that’s on the South 
African side. On the international side, I mean there were lots of people who 
were very engaged. I mean there was a guy from Barbados who was 
probably one of the most senior trade unionists in the Caribbean called Frank 
Walcott not the cricketer, but anyway, he was very engaged in all this work. 
We had a very strong delegation at the Bahamas CHOGM, obviously when 
the EPG was being formed. I think I organised one of the first, certainly, ANC 
led delegations to Jamaica back in the ‘80s which was one of the first links 
they had with Jamaica. So I think the Commonwealth played quite a role in 
making those links. But coming to your question about personalities: and I 
think on the PAC side it probably would be unfair not to mention Piroshaw 
Camay [unclear 30.55] who you may have come across in a new incarnation. 
He now does a lot of work on NGO in civil society in South Africa where he 
was the leading PAC trade union person at the time. 
 
SO: You mentioned helping to arrange for Sydney Mufamadi and Jay Naidoo 
to come to Vancouver. It strikes me as another example of a 
Commonwealth organisation providing a reason for opponents of 
apartheid South Africa to meet Commonwealth leaders, rather as Abdul 
Minty used the Commonwealth Journalist Association, because he was 
the Editor, of course, of Anti-Apartheid News. In that guise he was able 
to attend CHOGMs and although obviously not intimately involved in 
discussion with leaders, but was able to use the space around 
meetings. 
 
CW: We did actually have a meeting with Geoffrey Howe in his official capacity as 
Foreign Secretary where myself and colleagues let him know, in no imprecise 
terms, what their view was of the British policy at the time. 
 




CW: With great caution.  No doubt duly briefed. 
 
SO: I’ve also heard it said that for all Mrs Thatcher’s passion ‘to play the 
pantomime villain with relish’, that Geoffrey Howe, in fact, deliberately 
adopted a much more cautious and pragmatic, but also approachable 
style as Foreign Secretary.  
 
CW: He was there, he would listen, he wasn’t confrontational and I am not sure the 
meeting achieved a lot, but at least there was an opportunity for our South 
African colleagues to present their views to him on behalf of the black trade 
union movement. 
 
SO: And then, there was of course Mrs Thatcher announcing that Britain 
hadn’t in any way compromised its stance. Mrs Thatcher certainly had 
robust views on the issue of sanctions whereas was no supporter of 
apartheid. And yet she’s held up as the villain of the piece. 
 
CW: I think sometimes her public pronouncements were a bit different than what 
was going on behind the scenes obviously as we saw subsequently in the 
later years. 
 
SO: Yes, did you remain in very close touch with the Labour Party figures? 
You have made reference to Neil and Glenys Kinnock, but what of other 
leading Labour Party figures? 
 
CW: Obviously, less in an official capacity when I moved to Secretariat because I 
was technically in a diplomatic position, so I had to be a little bit more neutral. 
I had various private contacts and indeed at one stage I was Treasurer of 
something called One World Action which was a charity of which Glenys 
Kinnock was the Chair; but that was doing work on charitable things 
throughout the world. 
 
SO: So one of a number of organisations that contributed or added its 
pebble to the pile of transition in South Africa? 
 
CW: Well I hope so. 
 
SO: Yes, indeed. Carl, thank you very much indeed for helping with this oral 
history project. 
 
CW: I’ll give you one last little quick story which may be worth mentioning, on 
some of the interplay that went on behind the scenes. I was invited in 
probably about ’86 I think, for my first ever visit to South Africa and at that 
time, of course, the official policy of trade unions was to boycott. The 
invitation had come from UDM, COSATU in fact, which was our main partner. 
And I was asked to speak at the COSATU Conference which was at Wits 
University in ’86 and it was at a time, just to set the scene a little bit, when 
COSATU headquarters had just been bombed by the regime. Various officials 
were having car bombs, the President of COSATU had his arm in a plaster 
where he’d been beaten up by the police, so it was pretty rough days. It was 
intimated to me by the South African Embassy here that although having a 
British passport, it was highly unlikely that I’d get much beyond the gates of 





SO: Well there was a state of emergency there then wasn’t it. 
 
CW: Yes exactly, so a very, very touchy, difficult times. Anyway to cut a long story 
short, there was a behind the scenes intervention by the British government 
to make sure that we got a limited three day visa by the regime and we were 
duly allowed entry for a very short period, spent sort of 24 hours a day 
running around doing things and then went back again. 
 
SO: So this is 1986? 
 
CW: I think it was about ’86, yeah. The second COSATU Congress. 
 
SO: So the British Ambassador would’ve been, I think, Patrick Moberley. So 
it was just before Robin Renwick came in. 
 
CW: I think so, yeah. But the intervention, I think came from Linda Chaulker at this 
end. So there was a case where the British government was playing, behind 
the scenes, a positive role to allow, on the quiet, something that they wouldn’t 
do normally … 
 





[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
